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Pudore:
The Theory and
Practice of Modesty
Rebecca West

Review-essay on Alessandro Dal Lago and Pier Aldo Rovatti,
eds., £logia de[ pudare. Per un pensieradebate. Milano: Feltrinelli,
1990.

1.
Rovatti was the co-editor, with Gianni Vattimo, of the 1983
collection entitled II pensieradebale. Born in 1942, he teaches the
history of contemporary philosophy in Trieste and directs the
review Aut Aut. Rovatti has published studies in the areas of phenomenology, cultural criticism, and political and psychoanalytical
thought. His most recent titles include La pasta i11giaca. Heidegger,
Husserl, ii saggetta (Milano 1987) and ILdeclina della Luce (Genova
1988). Dal Lago, born in 1947, teaches political science at the
University of Milan. He contributed an essay to the volume IL
pensieradebole entitled "L'etica della debolezza. Simone Weil e il
nichilismo." He has edited various works of Hannah Arendt, and
among his most recent titles are IL paliteismo madema (Milano
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1989) and II parndossodell'agirc (Napoli 1990).
The volume Elogio def pudore consists of a first seclion by
Rovatti in which he writes an excursus called "Effetti del pensiero
dcbole," followed by a chapter entitled "Elogio del pudore." The
second section, by Dal Lago, includes his excursus, "La tentazione
dclla forza," and a chapter dedicated to Heidegger, "La politica
dcl filosofo. Heidegger e noi." The "Appendicc," which in fact
takes up more than half the volume, is made up of five previously
published essays, three by Rovatti and two by Dal Lago. Both
Rovatti and Dal Lago summarize and respond to various reactions to and critiques of "pensiero debole" in their first chapters.
Rovatti then moves on to an elaboration
of the concept of
"pudore" in relation primarily to the issue of the subject, while
Dal Lago undertakes to do a "weak" reading of Heidegger's 1933
der deutsche11Universitat, which
discourse Die Sclbstbehaupt1111g
inaugurated his assumption of the rectorship of the University of
Frciburg. All of the essays, to one degree or another, attempt to
deal with the ethics of philosophizing, both from the point of
view of the contemporary transformation of philosophical language and from that of the relation of philosophy to other discourses, be they literary, political, or private.
Rovatti opens "Effetti del pcnsiero debole" by writing of the
many effects the proposal of "weak thought" has created since the
appearance of the eponymous volume in 1983. Well beyond the
immediate philosophical context, the word "debole" has been
taken up by various specialists and non-specialists alike to capture what Rovatti terms "una risonanza semantica ... leJ un
bisogno" (9). Seeking some way of approaching the great and
abiding questions concerning truth, the representability of experience, the individual's identity, and so on, while recognizing the
limits of a purely analytical and/ or rational approach-an
unselfconsciously "strong" approach, in short-many
welcomed the
proposition of a "weak thought," while many others saw it as a
direct threat not only to the traditional strengths of philosophy
but to thought itself. Rovatti notes that while the 1983 volume's
overall tone was "poetica, sperimentale, aperta, per sua natura
non inglobante," the negative reactions were disproportionately
"definitorie, generalizzanti,
rapidamente
liquidatorie"
(10).
However, Rovatti recognizes the necessity now of going beyond
the experimental and generally open proposition of "debolezza"
advanced by the 1983 collection if "weak thought" is going to be
anything more than an already consumed or used-up metaphor
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for a variety of concerns and attitudes.
Before positing a way of doing so, he returns to the negative
critiques advanced against it, primarily the arguments of C. A.
Viano in his book Va' pensiero. Debolezza e indeterminazione nel
"Pensierodebole" (Einaudi, 1985). Anyone who has read Viano's
book knows how sharp, ironic, and ultimately dismissive his critique of weak thought is. Redubbing the representatives
of
"debolezza" as "i flebili," he writes that the culture they are suggesting is "consolatoria," "una macchina apologetica," and that
their proposition is nothing more than a "moda" which reproposes "vecchie masserizie." Rovatti succinctly sums up Viano's critique: "Ma qual' e il punto? 'Manca la teoria'" (12). The essays in
the 1983 collection refuse theory in favor of hermeneutics, etymological speculations, dialectics and difference, and literary digressions. These are not "conoscenza," according to Viano, even if
they can be called "pensiero." And clearly philosophy's task is in
the realm of knowledge and not mere thought.
There followed a debate, on the pages of La Stampa, between
Viano and Vattimo. Rovatti also later attempted a reply to Viano's
criticism in a piece published in La Repubblica on December 16,
1985, entitled "Seil filosofo ha paura." In it he makes two points
to which he returns in the present chapter: one, that the term
"pensiero debole" was and is "una metafora infelice" in the sense
in which all metaphors are unfortunate and failed, that is, are
attempts at completely and fully describing something while having already recognized the impossibility of doing so. Second, he
asserts that negative critiques of weak thought are motivated pri marily by fear of the loss of philosophy's standing and of the
philosopher's privileged relationship to language. To assert that
weak thought is dismissible because it is "only literature" is to
imply, of course, that there is writing which is absolutely distinguishable from literature; that, in other words, philosophy is
somehow beyond and safe from the "dangers" of polysemy,
metaphorical modes of thought and expression, and temporality.
To suggest that such is not the case is certainly to deny philosophy's exclusive and privileged relationship to truth and to language through which it is expressed.
Rovatti's point is precisely this, and he makes it in reference
to another negative critique of "weak thought": that of Massimo
Cacciari who, in an interview published in the Corrieredel Ticino
on June 11, 1988, said that the success of weak thought
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quella certa vague post-heideggeriana
che ha avuto successo
soprattutto presso i discepoli di Derrida in Francia e poi si e diffusa anche in Italia e negli Stati Uniti, ... non sia dovuto ad altro
che alla sua natura di mera Ietteratura. 11pensiero debole e Ietteratura, una letteratura che porta ad espressione quella che e ormai
l'idea guida de! nostro senso comune, la convinzione che ii
molteplice, il frammento, sia qualcosa che in quanto tale possa
contestare e decostruire la totalita. (15)

Rovatti sees in this a reappearance of "l'antica paura che la purezza della teoria, che il filosofo dovrebbe sorvegliare, possa subire la
contaminazione di un discorso esterno e secondario" (15). If, as
Cacciari suggests, literature is the realm of common sense regarding the multiple and the fragmentary, then philosophy is perforce
something else-or it too becomes "mere literature."
Rovatti
argues that weak thought introduces the notion that philosophy is
also (and must be) the realm of the multiple, the fragmentary, and
above all the "non dicibile" which is "il nostro qui ed ora" (16). In
so doing, he once more challenges the presuppositions of philosophical language's privileged access to truth, and the philosopher's privileged subjectivity which permits him or her total
objectivity and consistency.
Here we are, then, poised once again over the abyss of resig nation; contemplating
the "non dicibile," must we then be
resigned to being nothing more than mourners? Rovatti's answer
is that we have other options, for he asserts that a recognition of
the loss of a "padronanza dell'io" need not lead to a purely con templative reiteration of what we can no longer do. As he puts it,
"disinvestimento" in the concept of "un io forte" is not the same
thing as "de-responsabilizzazione,"
nor, I would think his argument implies, does rejection of the concept of foundational truths
expressible in privileged discourse mean that all that is left are
assertions of the futility of thought and the radical limits of language. This would indeed be a resigned and nostalgic attitude
without any ethical potential or force.
So we arrive to the question: How to proceed? What indeed
can the mode of thought called "weak" do once it has pointed out
the limitations of traditional metaphysical discourse, once it has
argued the unprivileged nature both of philosophical language
and of the philosophizing
subject? Rovatti writes that weak
thought and the resultant "pudore del linguaggio" are, like all
metaphors, "un abbassamento di voce, un silenzio nel linguaggio
e nel pensiero: il tentativo di sbloccare una pienezza" (20). Weak
thought is not yet another salvific proposal nor is it a project
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which seeks ultimately to transcend its own limits by offering systematized and systematizing substitutions for other past failed
projects. It seeks to remain in the realm of risk, contradiction, and
conflict:
Dunque l' esercizio del pudore, che qui indichiamo come la chiave
del pensiero debole, e il tentativo di abitare una condizione di conflitto con noi stessi. E allora il pensiero debole potrebbe essere il
tentativo di 'dire'questa condizione nella sua paradossalita. (22)

The "pudore" of which Rovatti speaks does not permit us to
remove ourselves from our shared "dimora" which, in order to be
"abitabile" must be "pensabile," but which cannot, through
human thought of any sort, be brought into line or dominated by
pretenses to ultimate truth or truths that resolve the dilemmas of
existence.
In the second chapter, "Elogio del pudore," Rovatti further
elaborates the concepts of "weakening" and "modesty" as an
ethics of philosophizing. With recourse to Nietzsche, Freud, Jung,
Ricoeur, Heidegger, Vattimo, and others, Rovatti explores the
issue of a weakened subjectivity as fundamental to his view of
pensiero debole's task. If knowledge is not going to be a continual search for domination and overcoming, it can perhaps become
thought's goal to inhabit ("abitare"), modestly and poetically, the
paradoxical dilemmas of self and the world. Using the metaphors
of "full" and "empty," and of "illumination"
and "shadow"
(which are connected to the unconscious), Rovatti proposes that
the latter terms, more traditionally imbued with negativity, are in
fact endowed with positive representational power in that empty
zones and shadowy realms (such as dreams) permit us to escape
from the tyranny of a belief in domination over ourselves and
over the world and our experiences of it. As we recognize that
the "non dicibile" is our "dimora," and that we are exiled not only
from a full grasp of experience and of its expression but, more
importantly, from our own selves (difference and alterity, that is,
reside within each of us and not only within others), we institute
a different rapport with thought, language, and actions. Listening
becomes more important than seeing; "pudore" (and I understand it both as "shame" and "modesty") becomes an inevitable
attribute; and the hie et nunc in which we find ourselves-the
space and time of our being and of our thought-are
endowed
with their full validity, in contrast to monolithic, transcendental,
and privileged concepts either of the consistent subject or of
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thought itself. I'll quote Rovatti's concluding words, which sum
up his proposal of modesty (which is also a modest proposal):
II non padroneggiamento, la caduta della pretesa, comportano uno
scarto ironico .. . II ritrarsi, che intacca la padronanza del sapere e
in primo luogo del sapere del soggetto su se stesso, o che
comunque ci permette per un momento di guardare le cose sotto
un' altra luce, e al tempo stesso un affidarsi a una zona mobile e rischiosa. II carattere fittizio e ironico della metafora esprime questa
instabilita ... un ulteriore cautela: quella di non far diventare
'seria' e stabil e una condizione che assomiglia piuttosto a un
momento (mai fissabile) di squilibrio. (47)

Thus we are reminded that weak thought is not itself exempt
from the instability and internal erosions which it explores.
Moving to Dal Lago' s "La tentazione della forza," we listen
to a very different voice. Although he and Rovatti clearly share
many similar preoccupations
and perspectives,
Dal Lago's
emphases are other. The excursus is a spirited and at times rather
acerbic response to the critics of weak thought. He suggests that
had the title of the by now infamous 1983 volume been something
more anodyne and conventional like "Saggi sul postmoderno,"
"Filosofia e letteratura," or "Crisi del sapere e filosofia," the book
would probably have received a no more negative or sarcastic
reception than many others. But it broke the rules and went
against convention by daring to assert that philosophical thought
could have something to do with weakness-that
philosophy, in
short, can be and is in fact made up of something which is not
only strong thinking ("idee forti") (53). Dal Lago then individuates two areas put into question by weak thought; first, "la forma
del discorso filosofico" and next, "il ruolo della professione
filosofica." It is well recognized that philosophy is having a hard
time living up to the scientific model it has often emulated and
that it has long since lost a certain kind of unassailable legitimacy.
But Dal Lago writes that it is time to say openly that all sorts of
heterogeneous activities now go under the name of philosophy:
historiography, philology, political science, interpretation of a
wide variety of texts the choice and importance of which depend
on which philosophical tradition the culture in question happens
most strongly to validate. Certainly there is also theorizing, what
Dal Lago calls "il lavoro della filosofia sulle proprie verita eterne e
atemporali: il soggetto, la ragione, il divenire, le forme del pensare, la verita stessa." But here we find "le scissioni piu radicali, i
conflitti piu insanabili" and here is where weak thought has
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found its severest critics as well as some measure of comprehen sion. For here is where "la filosofia gioca la sua partita eterna, che
e quella della verita, della propria verita, e quindi della propria
legittimita" (all quotations on 56). Now, regarding the form or
forms of philosophical discourse, Dal Lago writes that weak
thought has been so severely criticized by some not because of its
practitioners'
interest in literature and art (which, after all,
philosophers of aesthetics at least have always been permitted),
but because it "contaminates" the "scientific" language of philosophy with literary language. He continues:
Se dovessi definire cos'e per me il pensiero debole, parlerei di una
pratica paradossalmente morale: divenire cio che si e, accettare la
marginalita della filosofia non solo rispetto al mondo, ma soprattutto rispetto ai propri miti fondativi. Miti che non sono difficile
rintracciare ... verita, forza, purezza metodologica, profondita.
superiorita, e simili. In questo senso, rinunciando all' esibizione
della propria poten za immaginaria, si puo parlare di pudore in
filosofia." (60)
As for the role of the profession of philosophy, Dal Lago 's
view is that philosophers do not have a large role (or at any rat e a
privileged one) in the various civil and political, as well as generally intellectual, debates carried on in today's societies. He does
not lament this fact, nor is he suggesting that there should be a
return to the times when philosophers had a special aura; he
wishes simply that it be seen as a fact. He concludes:
Nel suo accettare le contaminazioni-in primo luogo il senso che
puo provenire da altri linguaggi, poetici e letterari ma non solo-il
pensiero debole minaccia le pretese [di una purezza intrinseca alla
filosofia]; sia quelle che provengono da un certo moralismo scientista or storicista, sia quelle che si manifestano in un certo tono orac'e bisogno di
colare in filosofia, compreso anche-non
dirlo-quello di Heidegger, quando e il caso. Come si vede, minacciare il primato delle forme ha anche degli effetti di sostanza. (58)
In the chapter on Heidegger, Dal Lago analyzes the discourse read by Heidegger in 1933 upon assuming the rectorship
of the University of Freiburg. (Dal Lago primarily uses the Italian
translation, L'autoaffermazionedell'universita tedesca,but provides
his own versions of the original when necessary to his argument.)
Dal Lago's thesis, in extremely condensed form, is that the discourse, strangely ignored by specialists of Heidegger, is an
"indubbia espressione filosofica" and should be approached as
such, and not only as an expression of "una scelta politica desolante" (61). Dal Lago's main point is that the discourse implicit-

DIFFERENT/A

182

ly proposes and furthers a "pretesa di potenza" for philosophy
itself and for the philosopher as educator not only of the people
but also of political leaders - a sort of "capo dei capi" or Platonic
"philosopher-king." This attitude is not, according to Dal Lago,
merely the result of Heidegger's personal megalomania, but
rather indicates once again the "qualcosa di perennemente eccessivo nella filosofia ... la pretesa di dire la verita ultima ... pretesa
di fondazioni trans-storiche, di parole dette una volta e echeggianti senza fine nel mondo." (103) The concept of "pudore"
seeks to counter this pretense, not only as it is revealed in
Heidegger, but also as it is manifested in those of his critics who
confuse "il balbettio del filosofo nel mondo" with "l' essenza del
totalitarismo" (103).

Following Peter Carravetta's lead, a few scholars working in
the American academy have begun to pay serious attention to
weak thought. The intellectual and ethical seriousness and rele vance they perceive in this area of work are no more evident than
in their thoughtful critiques of it. (We do not, after all, criticize
what we do not value.) In Maurizio Viano's essay, "Sesso debole,
pensiero debole," published in the 1989 Annali d'Italianistica volume dedicated to women's voices in Italian literature, he brings
feminism and weak thought together in such a way as to highlight some of the inherently flawed aspects of the latter. If, as the
"debolisti" insist, both the subject and language are not transcendental entities but rather are tied to temporality, flux, contradiction, and the local, then surely they are also gendered and sexed
entities . But gender is never discussed as a conditioning factor of
thought in the work of the "debolisti," nor are the "weakened"
perspectives proposed and advanced by feminist critiques of
dominant culture and discourse recognized. Viano can argue his
own case much better than I, and I therefore urge that his essay be
read in its entirety. My point here is that this "blind spot"
remains in the volume I have discussed, and deserves to be fur ther questioned. Rovatti proposes that "debolezza" is a metaphor
that reflects a "risonanza semantica e un bisogno" in many different arenas of current critical and theoretical production. But if we
think for a moment about the "semantic resonance" of the new
term being advanced-pudore-we
cannot help thinking about its
etymological sense and its semantic field, both of which pertain to
gender and to the sexual sphere.
2.
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The Dizionario italiano ragionato gives us the following information regarding the word "pudore":
latino: pudor, pudoris; dal verbo pudere: "vergognarsi."
Nell'accettazione piu legata all'etimologia: Que! ritegno che trattiene del mostrare pubblicamente le parti intime del corpo o parti
pudende (di cui si deve avere vergogna). Tuttavia i dizionari contemporanei presentano imbarazzanti diversita; vi si pub infatti
leggere che il pudore e "un sentimento di riserbo e di vergogna nei
confronti di tutto quanta riguarda la sfera sessuale", ma anche che
il pudore e "un senso di avversione e difesa nei confronti degli
aspetti equivoci e morbosi del sesso". Forse oggi potremmo dire:
"il naturale senso di ritegno per quanto riguarda sia l'intimita fisica
sia l'intimita spirituale della propria persona e della altrui.

The related term "pudicizia" is defined as "discrezione nel parlare
e nell' agire, in particolare riferita al sesso."
Of course, Rovatti and Dal Lago are using the term
"pudore" in ways distant from its etymology. Nonetheless, their
own aversion to an explicit acknowledgment of the gendered
nature of the subject can perhaps be seen as etymologically "pudi co." It is a commonly shared reaction that "pudore" is a term
most often applied to women in everyday speech, as well as a
fundamental concept at the basis of many elaborations of Freud
regarding female sexual development and behavior. In choosing
this particular term, Rovatti and Dal Lago cannot have been deaf
to such resonances. I am not out to "get" the proponents of weak
thought and philosophical modesty, both of which are to my
mind welcome and potentially positive propositions.
Yet the
problematic and disturbing silence of these thinkers around the
issue of the sexual and gendered aspects not only of the fractured
subject of which they so consistently speak, but of systems of
thought and presuppositions of language that have dominated
and continue to dominate their own culture is, I think, worthy of
further note. If they themselves wish to admit various "contaminations"-poetic,
literary, and so on-into philosophical discourse, will the resultant "abbassamento di voce" nonetheless
affect a paradoxically disembodied yet distinctly and exclusively
male voice? There are good silences and bad silences; if we are
silent because we aim to be so, then perhaps we are indeed
involved in "unblocking a fullness." If, however, we are silent
because we have no voice, or rather, a voice unheard and ignored,
then we remain in the realm of imposed lack rather than potential
fullness. The heterogeneity of "pensiero debole" and of its advo-
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cates-as Rovatti put it, its "poetic, experimental, open, and
unsystematized" nature-appears
to welcome the participation of
widely diverse discourses and practices. Can the difference that
has been and continues to be biologically, culturally, politically,
and socially defined between the male and female remain a moot
subject for philosophy, especially for a "filosofia pudica"? It has
not remained so for literature, for literary and cultural criticism,
for history, for law, for politics.
Another stimulating critique of weak thought has recently been
elaborated by Edmund Jacobitti in his "On the Wisdom of the
Most Recent Italians or How Italian is Weak Thought?" which
was read at the 1989 Purdue University Conference on Romance
Languages, Literatures and Film and published in the conference's journal, RomanceLanguagesAnnual (Vol. I, 1989). Jacobitti's
critique is quite different from Viano's; his interest is in the
debolisti's general avoidance of any reference to the specifically
Italian philosophical tradition with its long-standing civic and
practical emphases. In this he finds a paradox, for weak thought
appears to argue for precisely a more practical "doing-in-theworld" approach to philosophical work. He writes:
There is in weak thought a shift of interest and emphasis away
from the Civitas Dei and onto the world of practice; a general recognition of immanence as opposed to transcendence, of the need to
forget abstract theories and systems and to get down to practical
hard work. (144)

Jacobi tti's critique-that
debolisti appear to have forgotten their
own Ciceronian -Machiavellian
traditions of "doing in this
world" -points out that, in spite of their claims to wish to concentrate on immanence, their concerns remain nonetheless "oddly,
wholly metaphysical" (145). He writes that they claim to be pragmatic, in short, but remain on the level of abstraction and devote
almost exclusive attention to the deconstruction of any and all
foundational modes of thinking. By working primarily out of a
non -Italian philosophical tradition, weak thought, according to
Jacobitti's perspective, may indeed not be very Italian at all-and
this to its detriment.
I cannot summarize Jacobitti's entire argument, but do
urge that it, like Maurizio Viano's critique, be read for the very
va luable perspectives it brings to some of the limitations and
flaws of the debolisti's project, at least as far as it has manifested
itself up to now.
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In my final few words I would like to turn to a brief consideration of the usefulness of the concepts of weakness and modesty for the critical, creative, and pedagogical tasks in which we
are all to one degree or another involved. If weak thought is
indeed a metaphor and responds to a generalized need in many
areas of thought and action, it would appear appropriate that, following the debolisti's lead, we make use of their propositions in
our areas of interest-literature,
pedagogy-just
as they incorporate literary preoccupations into philosophical discourse and
practice. In fact, I would like to see more of an explicitly open
exchange in both directions. Many of us have moved toward
weak thought and its advocates in the role either of supporters or
detractors, but all as disseminators. It would be good to see the
debolisti move beyond what is still primarily the world inhabited
by professional philosophers, toward the worlds lived in by writers, literary critics and theoreticians, and teachers of other related
disciplines. They "contaminate" their discourses with those of literature, psychoanalysis, and all sorts of areas and methodologies,
of course; but I am speaking of a different sort of opening out,
that would bring the living voices of non-philosophers into their
activities, and would curtail a bit the tendency to elitism that
quite clearly mars their stance. How many more readings of
Heidegger can we-or they-find useful to being (with a small
"b")? Would pondering together the not inconsiderable problem
of how and what we teach, of the validity of academic institutions
of all sorts, and of the domination of our Western academies by
what is still preponderantly strong thought and practices be any
less valid a way of divesting in concepts of the "io forte" and of
strong thought than re-reading certain modern masters of the
philosophical tradition for yet another time? This may be an
unfair criticism of the weak thinkers, for they turn attention quite
naturally to texts and issues most closely associated to their own
immediate areas of professional concern, as do we all. But if you
are advocating a general shift in perspective and "contaminating "
your discipline with the language and views of others, are you
not implicitly advocating as well real changes in academic practices that affect both present and future thinkers of whatever ilk?
To end on an openly personal note, I want to give voice to
my own sense of how I would like to incorporate the perspectives
of "weakness" and "modesty" into my own practices as an
American woman academic. I have long been interested in what
might metaphorically be called the "muted" qualities of certain
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writers and of certain poetics and practices. Yet I am also aware
that my profession is a declarative one; both criticism and teach ing have traditionally relied on an assertive style, a mastery of a
body of material, and a hierarchy not only of judgments but of
institutional practices by which the academy functions. Weak
thought first captured my attention precisely for its "semantic resonance"; how good to read of a project openly situated in the
"muted" realm of weakness as opposed to the "declarative" kingdom of strength! As I read more, however, my initially enthusiastic response has itself been muted somewhat. I've alluded to
some aspects of weak thought - the fundamental lack of attention
to the gendered nature of experience; the essential avoidance of
issues pertaining to "doing in the world," the elitism-that dis turb me and many of my colleagues also working in our shared
context of the American academy. But it is not only these lacks
that create a certain diffidence in me. It is the failure, at least so
far, to explore the very concrete ethical, social, personal, and especially pedagogical implications of "debolezza." Our professional
discourses have changed radically in the last twenty years or so,
but I fear that the changes affect us locally as professional academics much more than our students or, beyond academe, our
contributions to wider societal and deeper personal ethics. Weak
thought remains firmly and squarely within traditional academic
boundaries; debolistiwrite and speak to and for each other and/ or
against professional fortisti. I do not believe that the professional
academic's role is or even can be primarily social and political.
We remain in the abstract realm of theory and the intensely specialized discourses of our own preoccupations whether we do so
"weakly" or "strongly." But we do have an important pedagogical
function and, for those of us who teach literature, we certainly
recognize that literature itself still has an ethical and pedagogical
value no doubt far beyond its intent. I myself have felt in recent
years a need to return to literature; that is, to escape at least somewhat the critical and theoretical mazes in which our profession
wanders, and to encounter the creations of writers, if not "inno cently" and "directly," at least non -aggressively. Whatever we
may have to teach our students, and however we may wish to
employ critical methodologies, I think that we can agree that the
human capacity to create, through words as through paint, stone,
or chords, is worthy of at least as much respect as the human
capacity to elaborate theories or to critique systems and struc tures. My own view may be seen as "nostalgic," "humanistic,"
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even "belle-lettristic," but it is my goal to help my students to
experience the richness and positivity of literature in its function
as a mode of creativity and a way of organizing the infinite proliferation that is experience, rather than only or primarily as fodder
for professional criticism and theory. I wish to weaken and mute
my own role as a critic and theorist of literature, and to concentrate more on my role as a reader and writer among many others,
not because I think that the critic's and theorist's is an irrelevant
or necessarily falsely privileged role, but because I want to take
the lessons of weakness, non-aggressivity, and modesty seriously,
therefore turning more attention to the creative and the pedagogical and to whatever literature and teaching (as contrasted to criticism and theory) might be or become.
I also want to continue to encourage others to think about
ways of breaking out of some of the straitjackets of the academy's
traditional practices as they affect our and our students' daily
lives. The paradox is, of course, that this can appear to be a call
for the transformation of our academic practices and institutional
structures, and thus a call to "strong" action, yet another "projectual" vision like so many that have come before us. Perhaps it is,
and perhaps any "putting into action" of convictions, perspectives, and thought is inevitably "strong." But we cannot avoid recognizing that within academics "we" are "they"; we create the
rules of the game-the game itself, in fact- within our own universities and colleges, and within our own broader practices such
as publications, conventions, debates, promotions, and the like.
Can those of us who believe that all too often the best is marginalized, while the worst nakedly ("spudoratamente") struts about,
modestly state that this is the case, much as the child who refused
to be awed by the emperor's non-existent new clothes? Can we
not only state it, but act on it in the contexts of our classrooms,
our departments, our institutions? The feudally baronial mentality that continues to dominate Italian academic practices, for
example, need a good dose of "pudore," as do many of our own
attitudes and ways of doing on this side of the ocean. It seems to
me that words like "foster," "nurture,"
"collaborate,"
and
"respect" are too often written out of our theories and practices in
favor of terms and acts of aggression, appropriation, domination,
and the like. I am searching, like many others, for modes of
being and doing that permit what I see as the positive potential of
weakening and modesty to function as an ethics at once personal,
professional, pedagogical, and social. If we and others involved
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in our enterprises who are part of this search-and I know there
are many - have the strength to be weak, we may find that living
out this paradoxical contradiction may have a modest value. And
that might be enough to navigate through the fragmented, foundationless world with some sense of direction, even though the
final destination must remain unknown.

